The Changing Fact of North America in the Global Economy by Garten, Jeffrey E.
Law and Business Review of the Americas
Volume 1 | Number 1 Article 3
1995
The Changing Fact of North America in the Global
Economy
Jeffrey E. Garten
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law and Business
Review of the Americas by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jeffrey E. Garten, The Changing Fact of North America in the Global Economy, 1 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 5 (1995)
https://scholar.smu.edu/lbra/vol1/iss1/3
The Changing Face of North America
in the Global Economy
Jeffrey E. Garten
Under Secretary of Commerce
for International Trade
L History of North American Integration
A. EArm EFFomRS
Economic, cultural and political ties between the nations of North America are not a
new phenomenon. The United States and Canada have an extensive history of cooperation,
having recognized the transborder aspects of water management, pollution control, immi-
gration and other "domestic" policies for well over a century. Over 200 treaties are now in
force between the U.S. and Canada governing boundaries, commerce, the environment,
energy, immigration and other areas [See Tables 1 and 2].
Management of shared water resources provides a good example of successful early
efforts at deep seated cooperation. The U.S.-Canada Boundary Water Treaty of 1909 gave
official recognition to the need for bilateral management of boundary waters and estab-
lished the principle that neither country should exploit the waters in a way that would dam-
age the interests of the other. The treaty established the International Joint Commission, a
binational group charged with overseeing water management, and later, broader areas of
transborder environmental protection and conservation.
In the economic sphere, commercial ties between the U.S. and Canada were crucial to
many New England and Canadian communities well into the 19th century, especially after
the British adopted free trade and its North American colonies lost their imperial advan-
tages. This actually led to demands by some Montreal merchants for annexation by the
United States, but a more satisfactory arrangement was a free trade (in resources) agree-
ment in 1854. Termination of the 1854 agreement during the U.S. Civil War helped to drive
the movement for Canadian Confederation in 1867 and ultimately the Canadian National
Strategy in 1879, which introduced high Canadian tariff walls.
In subsequent years, interest in bilateral free trade surfaced off and on. A tremendous
upsurge in U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 1960's revived this interest in both
countries, and found its most concrete expression in the 1965 Automotive Products
Agreement between the U.S. and Canada. The Auto Pact provides for duty-free treatment of
finished vehicles and parts between the two countries and helped set in motion a process
which eventually led to a comprehensive free trade agreement (FTA) more than two
decades later. The Auto Pact both responded to, and stimulated, rationalization in the North
American automotive industry.
On yet another level, Alberta and Montana, Quebec and the New England states,
British Columbia and Washington, Ontario and the Great Lakes states, and New York and
Quebec have all enjoyed close relations. Their functional agreements to cooperate in such
areas as energy, trade, the environment and education have enriched our binational cooper-
ative efforts. These relationships were extensive enough to cause the U.S. State Department
to conduct a 1976 study which found that state/provincial interaction was "pervasive in
scope, extending to all functional areas of governmental activities.'
Like Canada, the history of cooperation on the U.S.-Mexican side is focused along the
border. A 1884 U.S.-Mexican Treaty led to what is now called the International Boundary
and Water Commission, which has jurisdiction over all questions arising from changes or
alterations in the Colorado, Tijuana and Rio Grande Rivers. Formal bilateral economic
cooperation accelerated much later, especially in conjunction with Mexico's unilateral eco-
nomic reforms and its accession to the GATT. Early steps on the road to regional free trade
induded a tariff reduction agreement reached in 1979, a subsidies code in 1985, and a Trade
and Investment Facilitation Agreement in 1987.
B. U.S.-CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEmENT
A distinguishing feature of U.S.-Canada relations is the significant commercial interac-
tion that predates the formation of our national boundaries. Business-driven integration,
augmented by this rich history of government cooperation, made our two countries ripe for
a free trade agreement.
As we entered the 1980's, the United States and Canada had the largest bilateral trade
relationship in the world, with $80 billion in two-way trade, and a combined $55 billion in
foreign direct investment in both economies. Since 1879, a key motivation for bilateral for-
eign direct investment had been for U.S. companies to get behind Canada's high tariff walls
in order to service the Canadian market. In the 1980's, however, the magnitude and nature
of economic integration began to accelerate rapidly with a sharp upswing in international
direct investment and inter-firm collaboration. From 1980 to 1989, the year of implementa-
tion of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement (CFTA), the stock of U.S. direct investment
in Canada grew from $45 billion to $64 billion, while Canadian direct investment in the
U.S. grew from $10 billion to $30 billion.
Growing investment was a catalyst to the trade boom. As our firms expanded and orga-
nized their operations more broadly, exports to each other's markets more than doubled in
both directions, a rate substantially in excess of our 50 percent export growth to the rest of
the world.
Of course, the enormous business pressures leading up to integration did not occur in
a political vacuum. In 1984, Prime Minister Mulroney approached President Reagan with
his interest in developing a free trade framework to counter what Canadians perceived to be
a growing protectionist color to U.S. trade policies and lagging Canadian competitiveness.
President Reagan, who had espoused the idea of a North American trade pact in his 1980
campaign, responded positively. The next five years were the subject of progressively widen-
ing negotiations.
just as we saw in the run-up to EC 1992, the prospect of change surely influenced busi-
ness decisions and stimulated some of this pre-CFTA business activity. Nonetheless, given
the long history and extent of our commercial relations, it appears that governments were
largely catching up with what firms were already doing.
C. NAFEA TURNiNG SOUTH
In contrast, on the U.S.-Mexico side, the dominant role of government is indisputable.
When the NAFTA negotiations were launched in 1991, it was the unilateral economic
reforms of Mexico that were the sin qua non for moving integration forward. Not only did
Mexico's accession to the GATT open its economy to greater competition, but the entire
Mexican economy was reshaped as the Mexican Government privatized entire business sec-
tors. The economic resurgence that followed was the lubricant for a dramatic upswing in
bilateral trade and investment.
Between 1986 and 1993, U.S. exports to Mexico more than tripled, with Mexico sur-
passing Japan as the second largest market for U.S. industrial exports. Similarly, U.S.
imports from Mexico doubled, with much of this growth in semi-manufactures and com-
ponents that complement U.S. production. Two-way trade rose from $30 billion to $82 bil-
lion in just seven years. At the same time, U.S. portfolio investment soared, based on attrac-
tive real dollar returns on peso-denominated instruments and heavy foreign interest in
Mexican stocks, reaching a cumulative level of an estimated $45 billion in 1993. With
NAFTA's imminent approach, U.S. foreign direct investment in Mexico increased $5 billion
in just the last three years preceding the treaty.
By the time we actually signed NAFTA, business underpinnings had been strengthened
significantly between the United States and Mexico. Clearly, it was this coupling of market
and policy developments that gave momentum and credibility to NAFTA.
The process had come full circle. Unilateral reforms by the Mexican Government
inspired a broad coalition of business and government interests to "lock in" these gains. The
coalition consisted of the Mexican private sector which was enjoying strong growth for the
first time in a decade; the U.S. and Canadian private sectors which wanted continued trade
and investment access to the Mexican market; the Government of Mexico, which sought to
give permanence to this new direction; the U.S. Government which saw the opportunity for
a wide range of benefits in a new relationship with Mexico; and the Government of Canada,
which wanted to ensure that Canada would not be disadvantaged by any new expansion of
regional trade.
H. North American Integration - A Current Snapshot
Before looking ahead to where we are going, it is important to understand where we
are. Let me begin with the extent of economic integration that now exists in North America.
At the outset, I would suggest that the phenomenon of "North American economic integra-
tion" is of a qualitatively different nature than merely denser networks of trade - it is based
on complex, cross-border corporate production, distribution and sourcing networks and on
increasingly tight linkages in infrastructure. This makes it difficult to describe the relation-
ship in traditional international trade/foreign investment terms. In cases like the automo-
bile industry, for example, talking about "trade" between the U.S. and Canada makes about
as much sense as talking about "trade" between Michigan and Ohio. Nonetheless, there is
value in putting some parameters around the North American trade and investment rela-
tionship, even if such data suggest artificial boundaries in some instances.
A. IiiVESTMEi
Foreign direct investment among the three NAFTA partners has doubled in the last
decade, reaching just over $120 billion in 1992 [See Table 3]. We are principal investors in
each other's markets.
The United States is the largest foreign investor in Canada and Mexico, contributing
roughly 65 percent of total foreign direct investment (FDI) in both Canada and Mexico
[See Figure 1]. The share of total U.S. FDI going to our North American neighbors (16 per-
cent) is substantially larger than one might expect based on Canada's and Mexico's share of
world GDP (4 percent). Looked at from the point of view of our neighbors, the United
States is the most popular destination for Canadian and Mexican FDI; Canada, in particu-
lar, is the 4th largest foreign direct investor in the United States.
Canada and Mexico's past import substitution policies have been a major incentive to
U.S. foreign investment in these markets; more recently, a larger share of U.S. FDI appears
to have been devoted to developing continental and global production strategies. Fifty-two
percent of U.S. FDI in North America is in manufacturing; this compares to 35 percent for
our FDI in the rest of the world [See Figure 2]. Canadian and Mexican FDI in the U.S.
shows a similar concentration in manufacturing, 45 percent of the total.
Portfolio investment within North America has been growing even faster than foreign
direct investment After doubling during the 1980's, portfolio investment among the three
countries climbed from $142 billion to $175 billion in just three years (1989-1992).
Preliminary estimates suggest that U.S. portfolio investment in Mexico rose further from
$22 billion in 1992 to an estimated $45 billion in 1993. A major goal of the Salinas
Administration was to attract more of this capital in the form of direct investment. The new
government of President Zedillo is equally committed to maintaining an economic climate
conducive to private investment.
B. TRAIE
Even more remarkable than our investment performance has been the explosion of
trade within North America. Between 1980 and 1993, intra-North American trade
increased by 170 percent, 50 percent faster than our trade with the rest of world. This is a
truly remarkable development if you consider the other dramatic structural changes over
this period - rapidly rising U.S. automobile imports from Japan, the emergence of the
Asian tigers as important global suppliers and consumers, etc. [See Figure 3].
North American integration is even more pronounced if we focus on exports, with
intra-North American exports growing twice as fast as North American exports to the rest
of the world. As a result, today intra-North American exports stand at almost $300 billion;
$4.60 out of every $10 that North America exports - almost half our total exports to the
world - are sold to each other [See Figure 41. Thus, North American trade integration is
approaching European levels, where other EC markets account for 60 percent of total EC
exports.
The dynamism that is occurring here in North America has given us a tremendous
boost. Just as international trade has been a driver of global economic growth, so too has
intra-North American trade been a driver of North American growth. Since 1980, intra-
North American trade has grown twice as fast as North American domestic investment and
almost 30 percent faster than North American GDP [See Figure 5]. Growing trade integra-
tion in North America has been a major job creator and a source of economic energy.
Despite our growing economic importance to each other, as a region we are not look-
ing inward; in fact, we continue to exert considerable influence in global and other regional
economic groups. North America accounts for 18 percent of total world trade and almost
45 percent of APEC's trade. The latter is particularly interesting, given the tendency of some
observers to treat NAFTA and APEC as competing blocs.
As these figures demonstrate, there can be no doubt that North American integration
was already substantial on the eve of launching NAFTA. Sidney Weintraub, a noted authori-
ty on U.S.-Mexican trade with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, perhaps
characterized NAFTA best as "a way of formalizing defacto integration.'
C. CnHMCrESUCS OF THE NoRm AMEwAN MARKEr
Nonetheless, expanding and adapting the CFTA to incorporate Mexico was a major
event. Debate in the U.S. focused on Mexico's lower income, lower wages and weaker envi-
ronmental record; in contrast, Canada's high-tech and natural resource-based economy was
perceived as a natural partner to the United States.
In truth, the similarities between Mexico and Canada, as seen from the U.S. perspec-
tive, are as compelling as the differences. The fact is, North American trade shares a number
of features in common. These features not only emphasize our extensive economic linkages,
but they help explain how regional integration can make us more competitive.
1. Movement Away from Substitution Policies
Prior to formal integration, both Mexico and Canada retained significant tariff barriers
- each about 10 percent compared to 4 percent for the United States. This tariff structure
formed a considerable barrier to market entry and was symbolic of their general approach
to trade - tariffs and nontariff barriers (NTBs) across a wide range of goods promoted
domestic production for a limited, sheltered market. The CFTA, and now NAFTA, represent
an important policy shift: an embrace of competition to improve the national capability to
compete in global markets.
2. Preference for One Another's Products/Markets
Unquestionably, we are best markets for each other. Mexico and Canada each source 70
percent of their imports from the United States, roughly 5 times our share of world exports.
Further, the United States is their largest market, responsible for the preponderance of their
foreign sales (76 percent for Canada and 78 percent for Mexico). Thus, we get the greatest
return in future sales when our imports come from one another. As Canadian and Mexican
sales to the U.S. generate growth in their economies, they in turn are more likely to increase
their purchases of U.S. products.
3. Extensive Coproduction within North America
The United States is engaged in extensive production-sharing arrangements with
Mexico and Canada that are characterized by their high proclivity to use U.S. inputs.
Many firms engage in production-sharing with foreign companies or affiliates. Japan,
Mexico, Germany and Canada account for three-quarters of all coproduced imports that
return to the United States for final assembly or sale. 1 The use of U.S. inputs by these coun-
tries varies widely, however. Mexico uses more U.S. inputs than the others by far (52 per-
1. International Trade Commission, Production Sharing U.S. Imports Under Harmonized System
Provisions 9802.00.60 and 9802.00.80, 1989-199Z Feb. 1994 (USITC Publication 2729). Based on
data for a program the United States set up specifically to encourage the use of U.S. inputs in pro-
duction-sharing abroad by offering duty-free treatment on the U.S. content if the coproduced
product enters the United States.
cent), followed by Canada (33 percent); in contrast, Japan and Germany have less than 3 per-
cent U.S. content in their coproduction products. Looked at another way, half the value of
coproduced imports from our NAFTA partners originates in the United States, compared to
an average of only 15 percent for goods coproduced outside North America [See Figure 6].
Consequently, when U.S. firms decide global competition requires a global production
strategy, the United States retains a much greater presence in the production process when
the arrangement involves a North American partner. Shorter supply lines, just in time deliv-
ery, and ease of return are just a few reasons why proximity really does make a difference.
4. High Degree of Intra-Industry Trade
The bulk of North American trade takes place in just a handful of products. Fully 60
percent of all intra-North American trade occurs in just 9 industries. Typically, the same
industries are national leaders in both exports and imports, with the most notable excep-
tion being crude petroleum (which figures importantly in U.S. imports from its NAFTA
partners but not in its sales to them) [See Table 4].
What we are seeing is that regionalization tends to accentuate broad similarities in
national production. That helps explain why, despite the significant differences in the
Canadian and Mexican economies, the top three U.S. exports are the same to each; more-
over, these same products figure importantly in our imports from them.
Regionalization, like globalization, appears to intensify local specialization within
industries. Thus, rather than resulting in a discrete allocation of industries among countries
at the regional level, with one country "winning" one industry (like autos) while another
takes over a different industry (say, steel), rationalization at the regional level seems to dis-
tribute business within key industries across the three economies.
5. High Degree of Intra-Firm Trade
Not surprisingly, much of that intra-industry specialization is actually occurring within
companies. We know that almost half of U.S. trade with our North American partners con-
sists of transactions between firms with some common ownership. Much of this trade is in
the commodities listed in Table 4.
Moreover, more of U.S. trade within North America takes place between related parties
(47 percent) than is true for the rest of the world (36 percent) [See Table 5]. No other coun-
try exceeds Canada and Mexico in the importance of related party sales in U.S. export
transactions, which stands at 45 percent for Canada and 39 percent for Mexico. On the
import side, the most distinguishing feature is the high proportion of U.S. imports from
Mexico that are between related parties (only imports from Japan are higher). In large part,
this reflects the extensive assembly operations along our border; however, the sharp contrast
in related party exports to Mexico (39 percent) and related party imports from Mexico (64
percent) suggests that more of U.S. exports to Mexico are going to independent purchasers
than is commonly perceived.
Sales through exports are only one means of doing business in foreign markets. U.S.
firms actually sell just as much to Mexico and Canada through the sales of their affiliates
located in these markets. In 1991 (latest year available), U.S. affiliate companies sold over
$128 billion of goods and services in Canada and over $17 billion in Mexico. While U.S.
affiliate sales are somewhat more important than exports in selling to Canada, U.S. exports
to Mexico are twice as large as the sales of U.S. affiliates located there.
Increasing intra-firm trade generates its own form of competition, with large corpora-
tions playing units off against one another. As the branch plant system (that is to say, affili-
ate firms set up in another country primarily to serve the foreign market) is increasingly
replaced by the integration of these firms on a continental basis, a major focus of competi-
tion is within firms, among operating units competing for production mandates. This trend
is reinforced by new technologies that heighten productivity. Thus, for example, as the
number of GM assembly operations decreases, the most intense competition each unit faces
is with the other units in the GM organization.
Il. Economic Payoff of Integration
Integration in North America produces broad based economic benefits that accrue to
the entire region.
A. EXPERIENCE UNDER THE CFrA
Although it is far too early to detect definitive trends in our trade with Mexico as a
result of NAFTA, the CFTA provides one gauge of the Agreement's potential impact.
The first five years of free trade between the United States and Canada have witnessed a
progressive rise in trade volume despite the fact that relatively slow domestic economic
growth in both countries should have suppressed demand. Total bilateral trade in goods
and services grew by $68 billion, from $169 billion in 1988 (just prior to the CFTA) to $237
billion in 1993.
Critics of the CFTA in Canada have blamed Canada's recession and weak, economic
performance since 1989 on free trade. In fact, studies published by both the Bank of
Montreal and the C.D. Howe Institute argue that free trade helped to mitigate the effects of
the economic downturn. During the period coincident with the CFTA, what little growth
Canada recorded was almost entirely attributable to strong export performance. Moreover,
the strongest export growth was to the United States, whose demand for Canadian products
grew almost one-third faster than Canada's non-North American trading partners.
The C.D. Howe Institute, which also analyzed the product composition of Canada's
export growth, found that growth was strongest in sectors liberalized by the CFTA. 2 For
these products, Canadian merchandise exports increased 33 percent to the United States,
compared with only a 2 percent increase to the rest of the world.
For the U.S. part, U.S. exports to Canada during this period grew faster than our
exports outside of North America, and our already high share of the Canadian market
increased. A study by the U.S. Department of Commerce suggests that many U.S. producers
became newly competitive in the Canadian market as the result of tariff removal under the
CFTA.3 Important gains were realized in key product categories; in fact, 46 out of 98 prod-
uct categories with significant tariff decreases have grown 100 percent or more since the
CFTA became effective. Moreover, several traditional import sensitive sectors in the United
States, such as apparel and furniture products, saw their exports rise rapidly as the CFTA
lowered Canada's substantial tariffs on these goods.
2. Daniel Schwanen, "A Growing Success: Canada's Performance Under Free Trade," C.D. Howe
Institute Commentary No. 52 (September 1993).
3. Jeff Hawkins, "Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: An Interim Assessment;' Business America, U.S.
Dept. of Comm., (April 20, 1992).
The CFTA also spurred cross-border investment flows. As has been the case with EC
1992 and NAFTA, such investment often begins prior to the formal event as firms anticipate
the effects of an agreement. Thus, between 1987 and 1992, bilateral direct investment in
each other's economies grew by $24 billion, from $83 billion to $107 billion in 1992. While
these investment flows were split about evenly in each direction, Canadian firms realized a
58 percent increase in their direct investment in the U.S. while U.S. firms increased their
already substantial FDI in Canada by 18 percent
Likewise, net foreign investment flows in the CFTA trade area swelled due to the
increased attractiveness of both markets. In fact, in 1990, for the first time in 16 years,
Canada experienced a net inflow of foreign direct investment, which continued in 1991 and
1992. The Royal Bank of Canada suggested that this was "broadly consistent with the view
that the free trade agreement between Canada and the United States has enhanced Canada's
attractiveness for foreign investment "4
Free bilateral trade under the CFTA has stimulated job creation in the United States
and Canada. In contrast, there have been few major dislocations, as the process of transition
and adjustment has been phased in under the Agreement.
Many of the sectors experiencing growth and job creation through increased North
American integration are higher paying, higher value-added sectors in both countries. For
example, an estimated 200,000 new American jobs have been created and are dependent
upon U.S. exports to Canada, increasing from 1.3 million in 1988 to 1.5 million in 1993.
Much of this export growth and net job creation has occurred in high-technology indus-
tries such as computers, communications, electronics, software, plastics, and scientific
instrumentation, in addition to the business services supporting these sectors.
Similarly, the C.D. Howe Institute found that in Canada, significant export-led growth
and expansion is occurring in such high wage sectors as business services, high-technology
industries, and natural resources. The study also concludes that the CFTA is resulting in
greater specialization of the economy, moving Canada into areas of higher productivity and
income.
B. PROJEIONS UNDER NAFrA
NAFTA is probably the most thoroughly studied trade agreement in history. In his
speech signing the side agreements to NAFTA, President Clinton observed that nineteen out
of twenty serious studies showed that NAFTA was good for the U.S. economy and U.S.
labor.
Nonetheless, economists agree that the greatest effect of NAFTA will be on Mexico.
This is quite natural as Mexico has the smallest economy of the three nations and the high-
est barriers. Further, as noted above, the CFTA already offered the U.S. and Canada substan-
tial benefits from greater integration.
A study done by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) for the U.S. Congress just
before the vote on NAFTA explains how the regional synergies work.5 A good starting point
is the NAFTA-induced reduction of the risk premium that Mexico must pay to attract inter-
national capital. The CBO estimates that Mexico's risk premium will fall an estimated 10
4. Royal Bank of Canada,"Free Trade Agreement: Two-Year Retrospective", Econoscope, (Feb. 1991).
5. Congressional Budget Office, A Budgetary and Economic Analysis of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, (July 1993).
percentage points over a three year period following implementation of the NAFTA (recent
political developments may delay this drop, but I believe the fundamentals that would cause
it are still present.) Less expensive capital will enable Mexico to finance a current account
deficit that is expected to grow as a percentage of its GDP, as Mexico imports more plant
and equipment to fuel the growth of its economy. Coupled with improvements in produc-
tivity, the CBO judges that Mexico is likely to achieve annual average output growth of 6
percent over the next decade. (All CBO scenarios show higher Mexican GDP growth as a
result of NAFTA and economic reform).
Simply put, higher Mexican economic growth triggers faster U.S. (and to a lesser
extent, Canadian) economic growth as well. Mexico's GDP is only about 5 percent of that of
the United States. As such, the NAFTA is estimated by the CBO to add only about one-
quarter of a percentage point to U.S. GDP. However, the U.S. GDP in 1993 was $6.4 trillion;
one quarter of a percent of that is $16 billion - a not inconsequential amount. The
increase in U.S. national income will come not only from increases in U.S. exports to
Mexico, but also from repatriated profits and dividends from investments in Mexico.
All in all, the Clinton Administration anticipates NAFTA will have generated 200,000
more export-related jobs by January 1995, pushing U.S. employment related to exports to
Mexico toward the 1 million mark. Contrary to the fears of U.S. labor, we expect NAFTA to
increase the demand for U.S. unionized workers. Our experience since 1987 shows that
Mexican demand for U.S. goods is most intense - and Mexico is least competitive - in pre-
cisely those high wage, capital intensive, heavy manufacturing industries which are heavily
unionized.6
NAFTA is already working. U.S. trade data for the first nine months of 1994 show
NAFTA trade accelerating, particularly in regard to U.S.-Mexico trade where NAFTAs
changes are most significant. Despite some slowness in Mexico's economic recovery, U.S.
exports so far this year are up 21.7 percent over the same period last year; in contrast, in
1993 slow Mexican growth held U.S. export advances to less than 3 percent. On the flip side,
while one would expect Mexican sales to the U.S. to respond to our economic recovery, they
are up a robust 23 percent - twice as fast as our import growth from the rest of the world.
(Both export and import growth with Canada are up a respectable 8 percent.)
Coupled with other trade developments, the results add up to an impressive picture for
NAFTA in the United States: so far in 1994, Mexico and Canada account for a whooping 88
percent of U.S. export growth and only 28 percent of our import growth.
Reinforcing this positive trade picture, we have not seen any early signs that NAFTA
might lead to substantial job dislocation in the United States. Through November 1994, the
Department of Labor has certified 12,015 workers (based on 114 positive determinations)
as eligible for NAFTKs transitional trade adjustment assistance. This number is far less than
that warned of by NAFTAs critics, and suggests that we are in a good position to provide for
those workers who bear the adjustment of NAFTA's contribution towards developing a
more competitive U.S. economy. It is notable that in an effort to ensure that this assistance
is readily accessible to those who need it, the trade adjustment program requires only that
workers demonstrate an increase in imports from or a production shift to Mexico or
Canada, not a causal link to NAFTA.
6. "NAFTA and the Employment of Union Workers in Manufacturing," Council of Economic
Advisors and the U.S. Treasury, (Nov. 8, 1993). (Nor have the expanding exports of heavily union-
ized sectors been offset by import gains).
IV New Structures: Private Sector Response to NAFTA
North American businesses are operating in new ways in response to NAFTA's changes.
Because NAFTA creates more options for serving the North American market, firms have
greater flexibility to determine how best to take advantage of the new opportunities.
Corporate strategies to respond to the integration of the North American economy are
comprehensive. Some firms are responding through increased production and new invest-
ments in their home markets, while for others, inter-firm agreements and strategic alliances
at the transnational level will generate a new regional dynamism. In either event, firms are
rationalizing and restructuring to take advantage of NAFTA.
Business development strategies for addressing a unified North American market must
be responsive to specific industry and company needs. The choice will vary from company
to company; no one approach will work for all.
A. ExPANMING Hom BASE
Companies are now freer than before to choose their preferred method of serving an
expanding customer base. For instance, with the elimination of tariff walls as a basis for
production location decisions, some firms can service their North American customers
most economically by exporting from their home base. Many companies are meeting
increased demand by retaining or expanding their national production capabilities or sim-
ply redirecting resources to exploit more fully existing capacity.
This is the case for Health-Mor Inc., which decided to keep production in Cleveland,
Ohio, rather than to move to Mexico after NAFTA removed the $50 Mexican tariff on its
$1,200 vacuum cleaners. Panamax, a small California company that designs and manufac-
tures surge protectors for high-tech electronic equipment, added an additional shift of pro-
duction workers in order to meet NAFTA-generated sales. Similarly strapped for capacity,
Ace Hardware, based in Oakbrook, Illinois, plans to open a $26 million paint manufactur-
ing facility in Texas as a result of NAFTA. Regional export sales spurred by NAFTA have led
to job increases and higher profits for these firms.
Even for industries that already have a relatively high degree of North American inte-
gration, the removal of many non-tariff barriers is allowing them to rethink their approach
to the North American market.
The auto industry is a good example. Prior to NAFTA, the Mexican Auto Decree dictat-
ed the terms of production and sale in Mexico. Among the more onerous requirements was
a "trade-balancing regulation" that required auto manufacturers to produce and export
from Mexico $2 worth of vehicles for every $1 worth of imports. NAFTA phases out this
and other restrictions over ten years.
NAFTA makes substantial vehicle exports to Mexico from the U.S. a serious possibility
for the first time. As a result, this year Chrysler Corp. plans to export to Mexico 2,500
Dodge Intrepids built in Newark, New Jersey, and 3,000 Jeep Cherokees produced in Toledo,
Ohio. General Motors has announced its plans to export 15,000 cars and trucks to Mexico
in 1994, up from only 1,700 in 1993. To satisfy increased demand for their cars in Mexico,
Ford is expanding production of the Escort subcompact at its Wayne, Michigan facility. All
in all, the Big Three expect to export 55,000 cars and trucks in 1994, compared to only 5,000
vehides in all of 1993.
B. ORGANZATIONAL Focus
For many large firms, the initial response to NAFTA is to create some type of North
American organization or business unit. In fact, the Council of the Americas confirmed this
trend in a survey last year. We are finding this kind of North American reorganization to be
true even of companies that had not previously been in all three markets - such as Heinz
of Pittsburgh, Pa., which has substantial sales to Canada but none yet to Mexico. Prompted
by NAFTA, Heinz formed a North American unit to examine the possibilities for achieving
greater economies of scale.
Warner-Lambert decided to centralize control of its Canadian, Mexican and U.S. oper-
ations in 1992, in anticipation of NAFTA. Under the new entity, Park Davis North
American, relationships between the three divisions have been reconfigured, allowing the
company to centralize operations when necessary as well as respond locally when desirable
to do so. The result streamlines production and minimizes inefficiencies.
These types of actions allow firms to assume a strategic North American outlook and
serve a unified, North American customer base rather than three distinct markets.
C. RATONALIZING PRODUCrION LINES
Increasingly, trade around the world is being restructured by the investment plans and
collaboration agreements between firms that are organizing their activities globally. NAFA
will provide an additional impetus to this phenomenon in North America. Thus, while
NAFrA at its core is a trade agreement, an important element of this is the new economic
infrastructure NAFTA provides for corporate investment.
As North American companies become free to redeploy resources between the three
countries, many larger firms with production capacity in one or more NAFrA countries are
finding new and better ways to achieve economies of scale and serve a unified North
American market more efficiently.
Many of these firms had built up dual systems of production in more than one country
that became redundant once tariff impediments were removed. The need to better utilize
excess capacity inevitably leads to the rationalization of production lines.
For instance, shortly after implementation of the CFA, Whirlpool ceased washer pro-
duction at its Inglis, Ontario plant, and instead, begin importing washers with more
advanced technology from its plant in Clyde, Ohio. Shutdown of the plant was part of a
North America-wide reorganization, which also provided for the movement of some dryer
production to a newer plant in Inglis.
D. STRmGIc CORPORATE ALUANCES
Many U.S. companies are establishing strategic alliances with their Mexican and
Canadian counterparts as a way to gain a stronger competitive foothold in a unified North
American market. The nature of these alliances range from targeted joint ventures to merg-
ers and acquisitions, depending upon the specific structural needs and business imperatives
of the industry.
Access and control over distribution and sales channels is a crucial factor in successful
marketing of food and beverage products. Pillsbury expanded its distribution and sales
capacity in Mexico by purchasing a 49 percent stake in a joint venture with Pacific Star de
Occidente to form a new company, Pacific Star. Increasing Mexican consumer demand, and
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a strong preference for U.S. food products, led Pillsbury to seek a way of improving the
market position of its leading brands.
Similarly, Miller Brewing Company acquired a 20 percent equity share in Molson
Breweries of Canada, as well as U.S. distribution rights for all Molson products. The pur-
chase gives Miller better access to the Canadian distribution system, a financial stake in a
competitive product, and control over distribution of that product in Miller's home market.
In the financial industry, Western Union and Elecktra Mexico are cooperating to mar-
ket their products and services in a way that capitalizes on existing branch networks and
name recognition without draining resources through outright acquisitions. Western Union
entered into a cooperative venture with Elecktra Mexico that provides money transfer ser-
vices from the United States to Mexico; it gives Western Union direct, immediate access to
distribution channels for its services without costly establishment of new facilities.
In the area of other services, CN railways announced a marketing alliance with six U.S.
railways in order to position itself for a greater share of the transborder freight traffic. As
part of the venture, CN North America is spending $155 million to build a 1.8 km tunnel
under the St Claire river between Ontario and Michigan. A partnership with APL Land
Transport is providing the first intermodal container service linking the U.S., Mexican and
Canadian markets.
Some acquisitions provide supporting services that will facilitate the firm's principal
sales activity. For example, the Chubb Insurance Group's purchase of a 30 percent interest
in Seguros Equitativa and its affiliate, Central de Fianzas, gives Chubb control over the
insurance, surety and bonding portions of its Mexican business operations.
Other mergers and acquisitions provide for market access. Following the Government
of Mexico's privatization of the national telephone company, a consortium led by
Southwestern Bell and including France Telecom and a Mexican partner Grupo Carso, suc-
cessfully bid for a 20 percent equity in the new company, TELMEX. The purchase grants the
new owners a six-year monopoly concession for basic telecommunications services lasting
until August, 1996.
Technology and infrastructure needs are a powerful mix in high-tech firms. AT&T
forged a joint business alliance with Unitel Communications, a major Canadian telecom-
munications carrier that will enable both companies to combine their national networks
and offer a wider range of services. Unitel will use AT&T's proprietary network software
and equipment in return for a 20 percent equity share.
Similarly, GTE recently announced expansion of its air-to-ground telephone network
in Mexico and construction of a digital network in Canada, which means airline passengers
will now be able to enjoy the convenience of placing phone calls while flying among the
business centers of all three NAFTA countries. GTE formed a joint venture company with
Telmex, Mexico's telephone monopoly, that will construct and operate a network of
telecommunications stations to service this network throughout Mexico. GTE is upgrading
its ground network in Canada as part of an already established relationship with Canada's
Skytel Communications Corp.
A more exhaustive list of mergers, acquisitions and marketing alliances can be found in
an Annex located at the end of this article. They all underscore the creativity and rapidity
with which business can seek new partners to improve production and marketing in an
expanded regional market.
V. New Structures: Regional Shifts and Cooperation
The dynamism of NAFTA is not limited to how business structures itself, but also
extends to how change will effect the economic geography of North America. Trade flows
will not move or grow evenly across borders. Rather, the flow of goods, services, capital and
people will strengthen between the areas of each country that share common interests and
are linked by transportation networks.
A. THE EMERGENCE OF TRADE CORRIDORS
This creates the possibility under NAFTA for dynamic "trade corridors" to emerge that
link all three countries, bringing enhanced economic benefits to communities and business-
es located along these routes. Communities along these north-south corridors may have
many more common interests with their counterparts in Canada and Mexico than they do
with other U.S. regions, even those that are contiguous.
We have already seen this phenomenon as a result of the U.S.-Canadian Free Trade
Agreement. An example is the existence of cross-border entities such as the "Pacific
Northwest Economic Region" (PNWER), which comprises three Canadian provinces and
five U.S. states joined together to promote the economic development of the region. Similar
cross-border arrangements exist between U.S. states and Canadian provinces to share
hydroelectric energy, coordinate environmental policy in areas like acid rain reduction,
jointly plan transportation systems and promote regional tourism.
The addition of Mexico to the U.S.-Canadian free trade agreement creates even more
interesting possibilities. The major trade links between the United States and Canada are in
the Niagara (Buffalo-Hamilton) and Michigan (Detroit-Windsor) frontiers. Between the
U.S. and Mexico, the largest share of commercial freight passes through Laredo, Texas and
Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. These major gateways are connected through major-trade routes
originating in Montreal and Toronto, passing through the Eastern U.S., southeast Michigan
and the industrial Midwest, and ending in the industrial heart of Mexico, in Monterrey, just
150 miles to the south of Laredo. The major border crossings in Laredo, Buffalo and Detroit
act as "funnels" focusing trade routes that pass through the U.S. in what are currently rather
diffuse patterns. The development and improvement of these routes is critical to an inte-
grated North American market.
This major Eastern Americas pathway is not the only emerging North American trade
corridor. Separate land transportation routes link Canada and Mexico through the Pacific
Northwest/California, the Rocky Mountains, and Upper Plains. Current predictions of
future trade flows indicate that the eastern corridor volume between the U.S. and Canada
will increase at an annual rate of 5 to 7 percent through 1997. Western route traffic between
the U.S. and Canada is expected to increase by 16 to 24 percent over the next ten years.
At the major U.S.-Mexico gateways along the North American trade corridors, expec-
tations are that commercial trade volume will grow even more dramatically. A study by
the U.S. Department of Transportation predicts that trade through Laredo will increase
by 120 percent by the year 2000, through El Paso and the Rocky Mountain trade corridor
by 110 percent, and through the California trade corridor gateway in San Diego by over
200 percent.7
7. Assessment of Border Crossings and Transportation Corridors for North American Trade: Report to
Congress, Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Dept. of Trans., (Sept. 30, 1993).
The rail and truck land transportation corridors running through North America
comprise between 80 and 90 percent of trade between the U.S., Canada and Mexico. This is
not the whole picture, though. Significant amounts of intra-North American trade pass
through ports and the intercoastal waterway systems. The Great Lakes and St. Lawrence
Seaway system are critical transportation links between the U.S. and Canada, connecting the
intercoastal waterway systems of the two countries. Freight can pass from Canada through
the St. Lawrence Seaway, directly into the Mississippi River basin and the U.S. intercoastal
waterway system.
The U.S. and Mexico do not currently have a such an inland waterway link, but as a
direct result of NAFTA, the governor of the Mexican state of Tamaulipas has developed a
comprehensive plan that could be completed by the end of this century to link Mexico's
intercoastal system to the southern U.S. Gulf Intercoastal waterway system through
Matamoros, Mexico and Brownsville, Texas.
U.S. and Mexican seaports are also integral parts of the North American trade corridor
network. High traffic Gulf Coast ports like Houston and New Orleans have been actively
forging links with the Eastern Mexican Port of Veracruz (the busiest port in Mexico). This
port-to-port route provides a much more direct route to the huge Mexico City market than
the land routes through Texas. Even before NAFTA, almost $5 billion in trade passed
through this route.
These evolving trade routes will have enormous implications not only for the
economies of these regions and the geography of North America, but also for popular sup-
port for NAFTA. Communities that find themselves along these evolving trinational trade
corridors will identify more with the prospects for an increasingly integrated North
American market. In fact, rather than passively waiting to see what shape NAFTA takes,
many communities and state and local governments are competing for the opportunities.
In an interesting East-West twist, the Port of Miami has been actively promoting a trade
link with the Yucatan ports of Merida and Progreso, realizing that they are in fact closer to
these important ports than either Houston or New Orleans. Port of Miami officials see this as
a long-range strategy that will ultimately set up triangular trade between Mexico, South
Florida and Miami's major markets in the Caribbean and South America - our future hemi-
spheric trade corridor, if you will. Such a development should help engender the support of
the large Florida Hispanic population that stayed relatively passive during the NAFTA debate,
in part out of concern that Mexico would divert trade from more established Latin routes.
Recognizing the importance of the links between U.S. and Mexican ports, the
Government of Mexico is undertaking major modernization at the Veracruz and Merida
seaports, along with those that form key links to the Western North American trade corri-
dors such as Manzanillo and Lazaro Cardenas. Under this program they will invest over $1
billion in port improvements over the next five years.
In another example, the Governor of Kansas recently travelled to Mexico, specifically to
build connections between her state and the governors and business communities of the
southern end of the North American trade corridor passing through Kansas. An interstate
business and government 1-35 coalition has recently been formed, to build support for the
recognition of the Interstate-35 highway connecting Laredo, San Antonio, Kansas City,
Chicago and Detroit, and to seek additional federal funding. They have already made con-
nections with their counterparts in Canada and Mexico along the same North-South trade
corridor (Toronto, Montreal, Nuevo Laredo and Monterrey). A similar coalition has sprung
up along the Rocky Mountain corridor.
We can expect to see more of this type of active exchange based on common economic
interests between regions of North America to accelerate during the coming years. Just as the
development of the U.S. interstate highway system had a profound effect on linldng our
communities and creating a national cohesiveness, so too will these new corridors create
avenues of regional cohesiveness.
V. New Institutions: Government Response to NAFTA
NAFTA's changes to our regional trade and investment regime require new approaches
and new government institutions to respond effectively to the emerging commercial land-
scape.
The broad scope of NAFTA makes this particularly true. NAFTA is the first trade agree-
ment to address comprehensively the "new" issues of investment, services, and intellectual
property rights. Moreover, NAFTA broke new ground in its Supplemental Agreements by
considering the interaction between trade and the environment, and trade and labor. New
programs to address infrastructure deficiencies along the U.S.-Mexico border also were cre-
ated to take account of the economic impact of trade on the environment.
Integration inevitably requires rules of the game to ensure that all parties have a full
opportunity to realize the potential benefits. The economic incentives in a North American
free trade area are a powerful motivator to create a system that works. The new institutions
that follow represent the common mechanisms into which we were willing to channel our
common aspirations.
A. DIsPuTE SETrTEMENT
The significance of any trade agreement depends in large part on its ability to deal with
differences over interpretation of the Agreement.
Like CFTA, NAFTA creates a Commission that meets regularly to review the imple-
mentation of the Agreement and to set out the work program, review trade relations among
the members, and discuss problems that arise. Disputes that cannot be resolved through
consultation may, at the request of a disputing Party, be subject to a panel review.
Regarding the CFTA, the most remarkable feature is how few disputes actually got to
the panel stage. By setting up a process that demonstrated we were willing to live with a
strong rule of law, we designed a system that was highly successful in accomplishing dispute
avoidance.
However, NAFTA did offer an opportunity to improve upon a few features of the CFTA
dispute settlement process.
To guard against conffict of interest, a concern that did arise under the CFTA, NAFTA
provides for Parties to agree on the roster of panelists; for panelists to be chosen by "reverse
selection" (each country appoints only panelists from the other); for panel majorities to
alternate between the disputing parties. These refinements will go yet a step further to
ensure that decisions don't have the appearance of being politicized.
We also improved the quality of the decision-making by bringing in more expertise.
Scientific review boards may be set up to advise panels on environmental and health and
safety issues; panelists dealing with financial services issues must be experts in that field;
and antidumping and countervailing duty panels should be comprised of judges, rather
than trade practitioners.
Finally, NAFTA includes several novel features to help minimize problems arising from
differences in our legal systems. When disputes arise between a company and a government
regarding NAFTA's investment protections, the Agreement provides for resolution through
binding arbitration. Instilling more certainty in the business environment should give a
boost to investment in North America. For private commercial disputes, NAFTA encour-
ages the use of arbitration and other alternative dispute settlement mechanisms. We want
NAFTA to generate jobs in our factories, not in our courtrooms.
B. NAF 'S SocAL AGENDA
NAFTA is an important political breakthrough in recognizing the relation between
trade, the environment, and worker rights. "Through its supplemental agreements, NAFTA
creates two new trilateral commissions to provide for cooperation, public participation and
dispute settlement on environmental and labor matters. How we manage these new institu-
tions will largely determine whether freer trade advances together with progress in protect-
ing the environment and workers.
These new institutions are in uncharted waters. They will have to deal with the sover-
eignty concerns of each country; moreover, they are going to have to balance providing a
proper framework for business decisionmaking without interfering in the daily conduct of
business, which would risk the gains of NAFTA. Whether we succeed or fail will have a pro-
found effect on our progress towards hemispheric integration and on our post-Uruguay
Round agenda in the new World Trade Organization (WTO).
In the environmental arena, the prospects for breaking new ground are best when mar-
ket-led and policy-led initiatives converge. Here I think the increasing global attention of
not only environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but also customers, to
the environmental aspects of production, packaging, and disposal have already prompted
business to integrate environmental considerations into their corporate structures and busi-
ness strategies. It is increasingly common to find multinationals whose policies are to
implement "best practices" in their foreign operations worldwide.
The private sector also is working toward a more integrated approach to worldwide
environmental policy. The International Standards Organization is developing environmen-
tal management standards similar to the companion ISO-9000 series on industrial product
quality standards. Canada has been selected as the site of the Permanent Secretariat for the
effort, and the U.S. will chair one of the six subcommittees under this effort (environmental
performance review).
Labor policies, on the other hand, tend to differ more among countries, reflecting local
culture and practice. Less progress in convergence has made it more difficult for institutions
such as the International Labor Organization to reach agreement on appropriate interna-
tional standards against which to measure compliance. In the labor supplemental agree-
ment, we agreed for the first time on a set of principles that provide for basic worker protec-
tions in North America.
Of all the labor issues, wages are the most contentious. This was dealt with indirectly in
NAFTA by former President Salinas' pledge to increase minimum wages in line with rising
labor productivity - a challenge for any of us.
This issue should defuse somewhat as Mexican workers' wages rise under NAFTA.
Since the Mexican economy started growing again in 1987, Mexican wages have risen 37
percent. Mexican economic growth, spurred by NAFTA, is absolutely necessary to continue
these gains.
In the immediate future, NAFTA's spotlight will be on the rights of workers to union-
ize. The U.S. National Administrative Office, the first point of contact for complaints about
labor practices in our NAFTA partners, recently accepted for review two U.S. union submis-
sions regarding freedom of association and protection of the right to organize in Mexico.
This will be the first test of how we collectively deal with sensitive, sovereign issues under
the scrutiny of public view.
One thing we'll have to watch out for - that our conduct of this process does not
interfere with the daily conduct of business. Obviously, decisions to hire and fire are made
every day, and we need to be mindful that the obligations of the Agreement are on govern-
ments to enforce their laws, not on individual firms.
We also will have to take a careful look at the relation between labor issues and broader
economic policies. For example, U.S. longshoreman have recently complained that Mexico's
efforts to privatize its ports have the effect of union-busting. Privatization is a key element
in Mexico's drive for modernization and development, and we will have to strike the right
balance between our efficiency and labor goals.
The new "social" institutions of NAFTA offer both the ying and the yang - more
cooperation, but also more contention. Their development will determine whether NAFTA
makes North America a more or less attractive site for business and investors. Done with
vision and sensitivity, they offer North America the opportunity to exert leadership on par-
allel initiatives in multilateral fora.
C. BoRDER INFRASTRUCIUmE
The U.S.-Mexico border became an important symbol in the debate over NAFTA:
would further North American integration lead to runaway development or would it pro-
vide the means to deal with the long festering problems of inadequate infrastructure? In the
end, there was a general recognition that only economic growth would provide Mexico with
the means to tackle its environmental and infrastructure problems.
In the meantime, we identified steps that governments could take to improve the lack
of coordination and funding for critical environmental infrastructure projects that would
benefit both sides of the border. Hence, the bilateral North American Development Bank
(NADBank) and the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) were born.
The BECC, in particular, will be a powerful force for coordinating environmental cleanup
along the border - not only between our two countries, but between often competing local
jurisdictions. After extensive public hearings, the BECC will assist states, local communities
and the private sector in sitting, arranging financing and applying environmental standards
for border infrastructure projects it certifies.
It is the financing issue that is most critical. The problem is, governments can only do
so much. The U.S.-Council of the Mexico-U.S. Business Committee estimates U.S.-Mexico
border needs over the next decade at $5.8 billion for water-related and municipal waste pro-
jects alone; some have estimated overall needs may be as high as $20 billion. (Table 6 illus-
trates the range of infrastructure projects on the drawing board.) Even with substantial
monies from existing sources, including multilateral development banks like the World
Bank, the "financing gap" is considerable.
The solution is to get the private sector more involved, both through greater resort to
user fees and through creative project financing for the region's needs. That message came
through loud and clear in an infrastructure conference co-hosted by Secretary Brown and
the late Secretary Colosio in San Antonio in July 1993 that was attended by some 500 top
financiers and project developers. It underlies the principal the NADBank is based on: the
need to leverage limited government resources with private capital.
Recently, we are seeing some innovative developments. For example, some 320
maquiladoras in Ciudad Juarez have pledged to contribute 25 percent of the cost of three
wastewater facilities in the region that would benefit both the companies and their commu-
nity; the federal and local Mexican governments would contribute 35 percent, with the
remaining share provided by a private investor. If the plan goes forward, the companies will
recoup their share through discounts to future water-use fees.
Also, Mexican officials are re-thinking their traditional financing sources. Local govern-
ment leaders in Tijuana want to establish their own tax assessment districts to help finance
a $117 million infrastructure project to build highways and pay for urban renewal. This is a
typical form of financing in the United States that up until now has been unheard of in
Mexico. Tijuana will seek the state government's approval of the plan under a 1984 federal
law that has never been used.
In a truly innovative move, the U.S. Eximbank and Banobras, a Mexican bank, have
agreed to a joint program that will make financing available for U.S. waste water treatment
facility exports to Mexican cities. While user fees will be collected to pay for the equipment,
the two banks will serve as loan guarantors if municipal payments lag.
There is also activity on our side of the border. The Arizona legislature just sent a bor-
der-development bill to Governor Symington to establish a new state authority which will
work with the NADBank to finance infrastructure projects along Arizona's border.
Finally, one of the biggest steps in helping Mexico address its financing needs may be
the decision of the OECD to invite Mexico to be the first developing country to join the
ranks of the industrial nations. That vote of confidence for Mexico's economic progress may
boost Mexico's prospects for achieving access to capital markets at better terms.
VI. Clinton Administration Efforts to Make NAFTA Work
Successful implementation of the NAFTA by the Parties is key to demonstrating the
success of the Administration's export-led economic growth policy and for maintaining
broad public support for meeting global competition through open markets. Our efforts to
extend trade integration in the Hemisphere, as well as much of our post-GATT trade agen-
da, will depend on how well we implement NAFTA.
From the U.S. standpoint, the implementation of NAFTA has several components.
First, we are monitoring Mexican and Canadian compliance with the Agreement. We
keep close contact with our business community so that we know when problems arise. So
far, implementation has proceeded relatively smoothly. The most common problems we are
hearing about are administrative in nature, such as customs enforcement, and are to be
expected when putting such a massive change in place. The U.S. Census Bureau is reporting
that between one-third and one-half of U.S. trade with Mexico and Canada is already enter-
ing daiming the NAFTA duty-preference, a high percentage given the newness of the proce-
dures and the significant proportion of our trade that already entered duty-free.
We also are keeping a watchful eye for any failures to implement the Agreement. We are
on the front line in hearing from the business community when a company believes that
they are not getting the benefits of the Agreement, both through our daily business counsel-
ing and through our formal advisory system (including our 17 Industry Sector Advisory
Committees and 3 cross-sectoral advisory groups covering customs, standards and intellec-
tual property rights.) We recognize that the implementation of this Agreement is as impor-
tant as its negotiation in determining the framework under which NAFTA will develop.
Second, NAFTA has an extensive work program designed to further liberalize trade in
North America. There are about 25 working groups addressing such practical matters as
finding a means for the mutual recognition of professional licenses to developing a trilateral
Advisory Committee on Commercial Dispute Resolution. Our biggest effort at the moment
is to identify products on which we can agree to accelerate the elimination of tariffs. The
U.S. Government alone has received well over 2,000 product petitions from U.S. industry;
under the CFTA, tariffs on more than 600 products, worth more than $9 billion, were
removed under this process.
Third, several new institutions are created by the NAFTA. As mentioned earlier, there
are new trilateral institutions on the environment and labor, and new bilateral institutions
on border infrastructure and financing. In addition, we have agreed to a North American
Trade Secretariat, located in Mexico, that will coordinate administrative matters for the
working groups. Locations have been decided for each of these institutions, and draft rules
of procedures and draft work plans have been published for most. We are currently dealing
with the challenge of finding the right people to head and staff these bodies. There are big
challenges for the effective operation of the U.S. national section of the NAFTA Secretariat,
which is housed in the Department of Commerce and provides administrative support for
dispute settlement. The extent of the demands the U.S. Secretariat will face under a trilateral
NAFTA are still unknown, but under the CFTA this unit averaged over 1 million pages of
legal papers a year in its "clerk of the court" capacity.
On the financial side, we have taken a major step in increasing our tools to deal with
disruptive exchange markets through the creation of the North American Financial Group.
This new consultative arrangement will promote orderly exchange markets in North
America, facilitating regional trade and investment flows.
Fourth, the U.S. Government has been particularly active in the area of business out-
reach. Through technical seminars, automated systems, and professional staff, the
Department of Commerce provides up-to-date information that is critical in enabling the
business community to take advantage of the NAFTA.
One of our most effective trade promotion efforts is the well-known "Export Mexico"
program, which focuses the efforts of the entire Administration on our fastest-growing
market. This program has provided literally thousands of businesses with information
regarding how to take advantage of NAFTA. In just the first 4 months of 1994, in partner-
ship with Federal Express, we conducted over 70 seminars across the nation that instructed
17,000 U.S. exporters on the nuts and bolts of NAFTrs customs documentation. Additional
seminars, co-sponsored by UPS under our "Big Emerging Markets" initiative, will be haled
throughout 1995. "Export Mexico" also provides on-going counselling efforts to U.S. com-
panies to help them identify trade opportunities in Mexico. Business interest is intense: so
far in 1994, our Embassy in Mexico has experienced a 50 percent increase in trade promo-
tion events, while our automated information system, "NAFTA Facts" has averaged 30,000
documents a month.
Finally, maintaining public support for the NAFTA will be critical, not only for the suc-
cess of the NAFTA, but to future trade agreements as well. The Department of Commerce is
constantly monitoring business response to NAFTA. "Success stories" provide encourage-
ment to other firms to test their wings with Mexico and are distributed via our biweekly
"NAFTA News.' Congress requires a full report on the economic impact of NAFTA in 1997.
VIII. Implications for the Future
Signing the NAFTA isn't a conclusion - it is a beginning. The framework exists, but
the reality is being created. We face four key challenges to NAFTA's success.
A. CHALLENGE #1: HARMONIZATION ISSUES
Integration means greater and more open competition. NAFTA has dismantled the tra-
ditional barriers to trade and investment, but like the proverbial onion, underneath there
are more layers to peel away. The absence of trade barriers makes the significance of other
policy differences loom much larger.
These harmonization issues - differences in legal systems, regulatory policies, compe-
tition policies, tax policies, exchange rate policies, etc. - are the future agenda of global
trade talks, but we will confront them first in NAFTA. As deeper integration extends to areas
previously considered "domestic' it is in our mutual interests to explore as many avenues as
we can for finding common ground on these issues. Some mechanisms are contained with-
in the NAFTA itself - for example, the trilateral Working Group on Trade and
Competition and the trilateral Work Groups set up at Canada's request to explore new
approaches to subsidy and antidumping issues.
NAFTA has already inspired some progress. Mexico passed a new competition law in
1993 that was widely praised in the United States, and suggests we can learn from each
other. John Clark, a top U.S. antitrust enforcement official, noted that in contrast to the
United States - where it took 100 years to develop the notion that antitrust law protects
competition, not competitors - Mexico's new law explicitly recognizes that economic effi-
ciency should be the touchstone of antitrust enforcement and can immediately begin "pro-
tecting the process of competition.'
Of course, governments are not the only players here. I am quite impressed with the
private sector initiatives to try to close the gap in commercial practices that arises from dif-
ferences in our legal systems.
One such group is the National Committee on Uniform Transportation Law and
Practices, which is working to develop a common approach to how North America com-
pensates for cargo damages and losses. This trilateral, grass-roots effort has among its par-
ticipants lawyers, freight-forwarders, transporters and shoppers; even government officials
have been invited to sit in on the panels.
This effort illustrates the many differences that can plague business "as it is practiced'
For example, in the U.S. and Canada, it is assumed the carrier receives merchandise in good
condition and is responsible for its safe transit; in Mexico, this is the equal responsibility of
the owner of the goods and the carrier. Compensation issues are also treated differently:
Mexico applies a formula based on weight that can yield very low recovery rates, while tariffs
filed with the ICC by U.S. common carriers determine the limits of their liability. As simple a
practice as the Mexican requirement that a plaintiff show the original bill of lading can reduce
the ability to sue, since the bill is often retained by the carrier until final payment is made.
To fully capture the benefits of free trade, we need to clear away the underbrush that
keeps us from having a truly integrated market.
B. CHAuENGE #2: MANAGING STATE/PROVINCIAL RELATiONS
Another challenge we have to address in the future is how to incorporate subcentral
governments into our integration efforts.
The manner in which states/provinces interact with increasing integration is complex.
As mentioned before, effective cross-border integration is often being led by entities below
the federal level. For example, the Alberta-Montana agreements on truck safety and licens-
ing, or the work that has been done on the 1-5 Pacific Northwest corridor are positive initia-
tives undertaken by state and provincial authorities.
In other areas, the overlapping jurisdiction between federal and subfederal govern-
ments (or the lack of federal jurisdiction) can complicate solutions to integration problems
and new market openings in free trade areas. For example, measured commitments under
NAFTA's side agreements reflect in part the fact that jurisdiction of many environmental
and labor issues rests with the states and provinces in the U.S., Mexico and Canada, not
with the federal governments. Similarly, some of the most implacable disputes between the
U.S. and Canada involve issues where jurisdictions rest with the Canadian provinces, such
as beer and softwood lumber. In other instances, especially along the border, subcentral
governments may desire to move toward greater regional integration, but balance this with
the desire to keep intact their jurisdictional prerogatives vis-a-vis the federal government.
Finally, there are areas where states/provinces are lagging behind the federal embrace of
more open markets and greater integration. How integration is viewed is seen through the
lens of how it affects local interests. Potential problem areas are already dear:
- In the services sector, states and provinces are the relevant licensing bodies and can
act to prevent professionals from other countries from providing that service. Several states,
for example, require applicants to engineering exams to be U.S. citizens, an insurmountable
hurdle if you are not one. (Exclusionary impulses aren't limited to international borders;
"tates often fail to offer reciprocity to engineering and medical professionals even when they
have passed an identical exam in another state.) These practices can make it difficult to real-
ize free trade in some services.
- Local governments are major economic players in their own right. In procurement,
U.S. states spend more than $210 million for goods, services and structures, while the U.S.
federal government spends just $80 billion in non-defense expenditures. Expanding
NAFTA's coverage of government procurement to state and local governments would
require them to overcome the inherent preference to provide advantages to local firms.
- States and provinces are increasingly active in providing incentive packages for
companies to invest/remain within their jurisdictions. South Carolina reportedly provided
$150 million in incentives for BMW, while Alabama provided dose to $300 million for
Mercedes. We can expect this competition for mobile factors of production to be even more
intense in an integrated North American economy, as the free movement of goods and cap-
ital within NAFTA generates new pressures for "one-better-thy-neighbor" policies.
A big problem is that local governments often champion local interests at the expense
of consumers and the national welfare, because their politicians are closer to constituents
who oppose change in the status quo.
Our challenge, then, is to expand free trade "inward", to bring our local governments
on board to the advantages of free trade without alienating them. If we are successful in
NAFTA, it will also strengthen our hand in future international negotiations, which are like-
ly to target local services and investment restrictions as they become one of the few protec-
tionist barriers left to defend.
NAFTA provides a mechanism for getting a head start on this process. Through its pro-
visions for consultations with state/provincial and regulatory agencies on areas within their
jurisdiction, it provides us with an opportunity to extend liberalization without undermin-
ing their authority.
C. CHALLENGE #3: FACILITATING ADJUSTMENT
NAFTA is critical to North America's ability to compete in a global economy and to
create more and better-paying jobs. For this process to work, however, we have to be pre-
pared to accept greater competition and inevitable adjustments.
While the sharpest debate on NAFTA was in the United States, in truth, the short-term
burden of structural change for the long-term benefit of enhanced efficiency may be great-
est in Mexico and Canada. All economic studies agree that relatively speaking, Mexico and
Canada will derive the greatest benefits from integration under NAFTA as they remove
higher initial barriers and derive greater potential increases in economies of scale. But
Mexico and Canada will have to adjust the most, too.
Maintaining support of NAFTA during this adjustment is a serious political challenge.
We will be helped by the fact that NAFTA's provisions are phased in over 15 years for those
industries most likely to find difficulty competing in an open environment, providing them
time to develop niche strengths and, where necessary, "adjust out." Other factors, however,
may add to the difficulty - Mexico's challenge to meet the requirements of free trade while
conducting communal land reform and meeting the needs of peasant communities is one
that is commonly cited.
It is our joint responsibility to do what we can to facilitate this adjustment within the
rules of NAFTA. Fortunately, each of us has taken initial steps.
For example, former President Salinas worked to strengthen Mexico's vocational train-
ing program in cooperation with the private sector. [We expect this to continue under the
new Zedillo Administration.] In addition, Mexico's Procampo program will provide income
supports to help Mexico's large population of small farmers adjust to ejido reform and
greater competition under NAFTA. Reductions in the interest rate provided by Mexico's
development banks to small businesses will help this innovative, job-creating sector qualify
for credit to modernize and take advantage of NAFTA's new opportunities.
For the United States, a key element in U.S. NAFTA legislation was a provision for trade
adjustment assistance, which already has certified several thousand U.S. workers for income
support and training while they upgrade their skills. President Clinton will introduce legis-
lation next year to replace this NAFTA-specific program with a comprehensive, national "no
fault" training program designed to dramatically increase the flexibility and forward-look-
ing skills of the U.S. work force.
Given the limited trade between Canada and Mexico that currently exists, the
Government of Canada has focused its resources not on trade adjustment but on a strong
export promotion program. Canada has earmarked approximately $23 million over four
years to help large and small Canadian firms take advantage of new business opportunities
under NAFTA. Targeted sectors include advanced technology, agri-food, environmental
technologies, and services. The federal government plans to sponsor approximately 30 trade
missions to Mexico, to which it expects the provinces to conduct 30 more. In March 1994,
Canada sponsored an international trade expo in Mexico for 425 companies designed to
bring Canadian firms together with Mexican counterparts. You can be sure we'll be watch-
ing their efforts closely for new ideas.
Such programs are critical to helping our citizens adapt to changed competitive oppor-
tunities in an integrated North America.
D. CHAILENGE #4: SOUND, BROAD ECONOMIC PouCIES
The Clinton economic program in the United States, combined with Mexico's impres-
sive economic reforms and Canada's recent economic recovery, have all combined to fuel
investment and growth in our region. Most analysts are forecasting growth this year in the
3-4 percent range in the U.S. and Canada, and are predicting a credible upswing in Mexico's
economy despite the difficult political developments this year. This makes North America
one of the few bright spots on the immediate international economic horizon, as Europe
and Japan continue to struggle for an economic upturn.
In 1993, the US GDP was 87 percent of North American GDP. It stands to reason that
what we do - or fail to do - has enormous reverberations in Canada and Mexico. It is for
this reason that the following policies of the Administration, though centered on the U.S.,
will also have a positive impact on our neighbors.
President Clinton has:
- set the stage for very significant declines in the U.S. budget deficit;
- begun new programs to educate and train the workforce, an essential step in our
ability to compete in the world economy;
- created research and development partnerships between the government and indus-
try in a wide range of "industries of the future";
- given attention to America's pressing social agenda, induding health care, welfare
reform and anti-crime legislation.
Taken together, these measures will contribute to economic growth, more competitive
industries, and a more productive and secure population - all leading not just to more
trade, but to an even stronger political consensus in favor of a more open trading system.
IX Conclusion
If you watch the trade headlines these days, you would think that the biggest questions
facing the U.S. - and the biggest stakes - are in China or Japan or Europe. You would see
very little about North America as such. But in my view, what is happening in our backyard
is every bit as significant as these other issues.
Maybe North American integration isn't so sexy because it doesn't raise tensions of
"geostrategic" importance. But make no mistake about it, the interaction among the United
States, Canada, and Mexico is of momentous significance. There is a "geoeconomic" and
"geosocial" dimension to what is happening on our continent, and in the post-Cold War era
these dimensions count more than ever.
First, we are witnessing a degree of economic integration that is approaching what has
been going on in Western Europe - only they started many decades before us. There is a
North American market, and it is going to continue to develop.
It is interesting to note that we don't quite know what to call this phenomenon. Is it a
North American Common Market, with the rules of origin acting in place of a common
external tariff? Is it a new kind of new "economic system"? Is it a North American
Community with characteristics that go well beyond economic integration? Is it too com-
plex to define at all?
On one level, it is not a bother not to be able to label this North American phenome-
non. On another, we need a vision of where we are headed. On the heels of a hard won
NAFTA debate, it is perhaps too early to tackle this question. But the question looms, and
leaders in both the public and private sectors will need to articulate not just where we are,
but where we want to go.
Second, the mix of factors affecting our integration experience makes North America
unique. It includes both highly industrial nations and a developing country. By contrast, the
European Union is much more homogeneous. Also, North American integration is pro-
pelled by business and economic forces, and by an underlying need to open our economies
to- better compete in the world. By contrast, the impetus for European integration has had a
much greater political dimension. North American integration, moreover, is being driven
by both business pressures and governmental actions - both from the bottom and from
the top - and also by a wealth of subfederal entities like cities and port authorities. In my
view, this is a microcosm of the multi-faceted but inexorable way the world economy will be
coming together in the years ahead.
Third, the success of NAFTA will have significant impact on America's future trade pol-
icy. NAFTA is a state-of-the-art trade agreement, encompassing as it does a very broad
range of issues from services to intellectual property rights, and agreements on the environ-
ment and labor standards. How we handle the implementation of NAFTA, and our experi-
ence with the agreement, will have a great bearing on how we approach future trade negoti-
ations on a regional and global level. In this respect, the stakes in succeeding are very high.
Fourth, there is a very high premium on effective follow up to NAFTA. We must not
succumb to the temptation to think that the conclusion of the treaty ensures that NAFTA
will work. There is much work to do. All three governments need to continually review the
overall picture to ensure that the many aspects of follow up are given a high priority. There
must be a constant temperature taking of the overall trends and problems in North
America.
In this regard, we need to be careful about backsliding in a range of areas. Trade liberal-
ization may have gotten a boost with the NAFTA, but history shows there is often a second
phase in which selected efforts are made to arrest inevitable change. President Clinton's
admonition "compete, not retreat" must be our watchword, along with a strong effort to
cushion change for men, women and families who need help. But we must move forward.
The United States is committed to working with both the Cretien Administration in
Canada and the newly-elected Zedillo Administration in Mexico to foster needed change in
the most humane way. We are committed to continuous expansion of trade in North
America, to the development of effective institutions to facilitate that trade, and to deal with
the broader economic and social issues. We are deeply committed to making NAFTA work
for all of us.
The continuing integration of the North American market will serve all three countries
exceedingly well. Of course there will be many bumps in the road, but the trends are posi-
tive and I am confident that we will surmount the challenges - economic and social -
that we will face. Many questions have been raised by Asian governments and business exec-
utives about the possibilities of joining NAFTA. This, of course, was nothing compared to
the interest in Latin America. The point is that much of the world is sensing that we are
building a dynamic and prosperous market like no other.
A North American consciousness is building among our three countries. There are no
headlines describing it, and that is probably a good thing. Let us build our market quietly,
and steadily, using practical building blocks, resolving disputes amicably, and summoning
the political will to deal with problems as they arise in a North American context. Let's look
for ways that all three countries can benefit. Let's show that zero-sum solutions don't make
sense for North America. Let's show that we in North America understand the true nature
of the requirements for deep seated cooperation in this rapidly changing global economy.
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North American Integration: Mergers Acquisitions, Equity Infusions, Joint Ventures
TABLE 1: Selected U.S.-Canada Treaties and Agreements
AGREEMENT: U.S.-Canada Boundary Agreement
YEAR: 1908
PURPOSE: Commitment between Canada and the United States to survey and maintain
and manage land boundary issues.
AGREEMENT: U.S.-Canada Boundary Waters Treaty
YEAR. 1909
PURPOSE. Bilateral cooperation in managing boundary waters; established the principle
that neither country should exploit the waters in a manner that would damage the interest
of the other. Created International Joint Commission (IJC) charged with overseeing water
management, later, broader areas of transborder environmental protection/conservation.
AGREEMENT: Migratory Birds Convention
YEAR. 1916




AGREEMENT: Hyde Park Agreement
YEAR. 1941
PURPOSE: Foundation declaration and agreement arising from beginning of WWII in
which the United States and Canada agreed, as a general principle, to coordinate and ratio-
nalize the defense industries of both countries. Founded the Permanent Joint Board on
Defense. Memorandums of Understanding such as Defense Production Sharing Agree-
ments and the Defense Development Sharing Agreement (1963) followed. Provided for
standardization/interoperability of defense equipment, data exchange, contract administra-
tion, committee creation, and other mechanisms to facilitate coordination of Canada-U.S.
defense efforts.
AGREEMENT: St. Lawrence Seaway Agreement
YEAR. 1952
PURPOSE: Agreement establishing the St. Lawrence seaway project for the construction of
certain navigation facilities.
AGREEMENT: Convention on Great Lake Fisheries
YEAR. 1954
PURPOSE: Established the Great Lakes Fishery Commission which coordinates the U.S.-
Canada Great Lakes fishery management plan (1978). Provided pooled lakewide/basinwide
responsibilities to ensure effective management of the Great Lakes' fishery resources.
AGREEMENT: Columbia River Treaty
YEAR. 1964
PURPOSE Provides for cooperative development of the water resources of the Columbia
River Basin.
AGREEMENT: Automotive Products Agreement (Autopact)
YEAR. 1965
PURPOSE: Provides for duty-free treatment of finished vehicles and parts between U.S. and
Canada.
AGREEMENT: U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty
YEAR. 1984
PURPOSE Establishes bilateral understanding on treatment of income and capital earned
in each other's respective territory. Presently under renegotiation.
AGREEMENT: Memorandum of Understanding on the Exchange of Import Data
YEAR. 1987
PURPOSE: Established mechanism allowing each country to rely on the other's import
data for it's export data.
AGREEMENT: U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement
YEAR. 1989
PURPOSE Established free trade area between United States and Canada providing for the
elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to bilateral trade.
TABLE 2:
Selected U.S./Canada State/Provincial Arrangements/Agreements
AGREEMENT: Montana-Western Canadian Provinces Boundary Advisory Committee
YEAR: 1983
PURPOSE. Composed of both legislators and executive branch participants; discuss wide
range of issues common to the border region.
AGREEMENT: National Association of State Departments of Agriculture/Canadian
Provincial Agriculture Secretaries
YEAR: 1984
PURPOSE: Coordinates cross-border issues related to Federal/state/provincial agricultural
trade, commodities, standards, and regulations.
AGREEMENT: Great Lakes Charter
YEAR: 1985
PURPOSE Cooperation agreement between Quebec, Ontario, and 8 U.S. Great Lake states.
AGREEMENT: Agreement of Energy Cooperation between Quebec and New York
YEAR: 1986
PURPOSE. Agreement to cooperate on energy issues of importance between Quebec and
New York.
AGREEMENT: Minnesota-Manitoba Agreement on Economic Cooperation and Trade
Opportunities
YEAR: 1988
PURPOSE Provides for improved economic cooperation such that trade and other benefi-
cial economic contacts maximize free trade area opportunities.
AGREEMENT: Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Cooperation on the
Management of Lake Champlain (Quebec/NewYorkVermont)
YEAR: 1988
PURPOSE. Enhances and establishes a process for regular exchange of information and sys-
tematic cooperation in research and data gathering on subjects affecting Lake Champlain.
AGREEMENT: Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER)
YEAR: 1989
PURPOSE Formed by legislators from Alaska, Alberta, British Columbia, Idaho, Montana,
Oregon and Washington; serves as a steering committee to develop/implement strategies for
regional cooperation.
AGREEMENT: Economic Cooperation Arrangement on Trade, Investment and Tourism
Between British Columbia and Alaska
YEAR: 1990
PURPOSE: Establishes venue for increased exchange of information and promotion of
trade and economic cooperation.
AGREEMENT: Economic Cooperation Arrangement between British Columbia and
California
YEAR: 1990
PURPOSE. Establishes venue for exchange of opinion and information on trade, tourism,
investment and other related opportunities.
AGREEMENT: Agreement on Cooperation Between Quebec and New York
YEAR: 1993
PURPOSE. Incorporates and enhances existing individual agreements in energy, environ-
ment, public safety, and economic development.
TABLE 3: Intra-North American Investment: 1992 and 1989
BIuLIONS OF DOLARS
Foreign Direct Investment Portfolio Investment
1992 1989 1992 1989
U.S. Investment in Canada $68.4 $63.9 $79.6 $74.7
U.S. Investment in Mexico $13.3 $8.3 $22.01 $15.03
Canadian Investment in U.S. $39.0 $30.4 $71.3 $50.2
Canadian Investment in Mexico $0.4 $0.4 $0.21 $0.11
Mexican Investment in U.S. $1.2 $0.4 $2.41 $1.81
Mexican Investment in Canada $0.1 - __ 1 I
Total Intra-North American Investment $122.4 $103.4 $175.52 $141.82
% Increase in Total Intra-North
American Investment 1992-1989 18% 24%
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA); Industry Canada; Statistics Canada
1Unpublished estimate.
2portfolio totals should be viewed as estimates given their incorporation of unpublished data.
31991 estimate substituted for unavailable 1989 data.
(-) Negligible
TABLE 4: Intra-North American Trade for 1992
MRIIONS OF DOLLARS
Top 5 U.S. Exports to Canada
M otor Vehicles and Parts ............................................................ $17,107
Industrial M achinery and Com puters .......................................... 14,944
Electric and Electronic Equipm ent .............................................. 10,988
Chem ical Products .......................................................................... 7,065
Fabricated M etal Products .............................................................. 4,771
Top 5 Canadian Exports to U.S.
M otor Vehicles and Parts ............................................................ $27,510
Crude Petroleum .............................................................................. 8,135
Paper Products .................................................................................. 7,862
Prim ary M etal Products .................................................................. 7,188
Industrial M achinery & Com puters .............................................. 5,779
Top 5 U.S. Exports to Mexico
Electric and Electronic Equipm ent .............................................. $7,144
Industrial M achinery and Com puters ............................................ 5,690
M otor Vehicles and Parts ................................................................ 3,897
Chem ical Products .......................................................................... 2,943
Prim ary M etal Industries ................................................................ 2,924
Top 5 Mexican Exports to U.S.
Electric and Electronic Equipm ent .............................................. $9,663
M otor Vehicles and Parts ................................................................ 4,998
Crude Petroleum .............................................................................. 4,424
Apparel .............................................................................................. 1,962
Industrial M achinery and Com puters ............................................ 1,773
Top 5 Canadian Exports to Mexico
M otor Vehicles and Parts .................................................................. $121
Cereals ............................................................................................... 97
Electric and Electronic Equipm ent ................................................ 60
Iron & Steel ....................................................................................... 52
Paper Products ............................................................................... 44
Top 5 Mexican Exports to Canada
M otor Vehicles and Parts .................................................................. $952
Electric & Electronic Equipm ent ........................................................ 415
M achines & M echanical Appliances .................................................. 338
M ineral Fuels & Oils ............................................................................ 156
Furniture .......................................................................................... 92





























Source: "U.S. Merchandise Trade: Imports & Exports by Related Parties; 1992;' U.S. Department of Commerce,
April 6, 1994. (CB-94-60)
Definitions: North America includes Canada and Mexico. Other Industrial countries incudes the EC and Japan for
exports, and the EC for imports (see footnote 1). Other Developing countries includes OPEC, Taiwan, Korea, and
"Other," which excludes Eastern Europe, the former USSR, and China.
1Seventy-five percent of U.S. imports from Japan are from a related party, a much higher percentage than for any
other country, in contrast, about 46 percent of U.S. imports from both the EC and Canada are from a related
party. Japan is not included in the import figure to avoid giving an erroneous impression of what is typical for U.S.
imports from industrial countries.
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ANNEX 1: North American Integration
MERGERS, ACQuIsITONS, EQurY INFUSIONS, JOINT VENTURES
SECTOR: Food
INmvToR Abastos y Promociones (Mex)
TYPE OF INvEsi TE. Plans to open McAllen Produce Terminal Market (US).




TYPE OF INvESTMEN:'r Acquired majority interest and managerial control of Trasgo (Mex), a
poultry producer and processor.
COMMiS: Tyson has been a minority partner since'88. Allows them to increase presence
in Mexican market.
DATE: April '94
I1vESTOR' Sara Lee (US)
TYPE OF INV SYMENT:. JV with AXA (Mex) to invest in its subsidiary, AXA Alimentos (Mex).
CoMmErs: Expands marketing expertise in processed meat industry.
DATE: March '94
INvESTORi Pillsbury (US subsidiary of UK company)
TYPE OF INvEsTmENr: 49% stake in JV with Pacific Star de Occidente.(Mex), formed new
company Pacific Star (Mex).
COMMENTS: Expands distribution and sales capacity in Mexico.
DTE: September '93
INVESTOR: Oscar Meyer (US)
TYPE OF INvEsTmENr. Distribution agreement with Sigma Alimentos (Mex).
COMMENTS: Expands marketing & distribution in Mexico. First phase of strategic alliance.
DATE: April '93
IN ESTO: ConAgra (US)
TYPE OF INVESTMENT: JV with Maple Leaf Foods (Can) to create two flour milling compa-
nies in US & Canada.
CommENTS: Improves efficiency for both and moves ConAgra Flour Milling into new mar-
kets and new lines of business in Canada.
DATE: May'92
.1 NA :LwadBsns RveSfteAeia
INVESTOR Cargill Inc. (US)
TYPE OF INvEsTmENr. Addition of slaughterhouse in Alberta, Canada to expand capacity.
CoMMENTS. Capitalize on Alberta's location as a large cattle producing region and its prox-




TYPE OF INVESTMENT. JV with Grupo Bannad (Mex).
CoMMENm: Provide competitive long distance service in Mexico. ($450 million investment)
DATE: January '94
INVESTOR: GTE (US)
TYPE OF INVESTmENTr iV with Telmex (Mex), combined with already existing partnership
with Skytel Communication Corp. (Can).




TYPE OF INvESTMENT. AT&T receives a 20% equity investment in Unitel (Can) long-distance
telephone company.
CoMMENTS: Establishes feeder network that allows Unitel and AT&T to offer transborder
services to multinational customers. Unitel receives access to AT&T's intelligent network
software. (Investment valued at $150 million - Canadian)
DArE: February '93
SECTOR Beer
INVESTOR: Anheuser Busch (US)
TYPE OF INvESTmENr Acquired equity stake in Grupo Modelo (Mex).
Coiimlmw Allows for a 17.7% equity stake in Mexican brewer ($477 million). Sole Busch
importer and distributor in Mexico.
DATE May'93
INVESTOR: Miller (US)
TYPE OF INVESTMENT. Strategic alliance with The Molson Companies Limited (Can) and
Foster's Brewing Group.
CommENs: Miller acquired US import operations of Molson Breweries and the US market-
ing and distribution rights for Molson and Foster's brands in the US. Miller also received a
20% equity share in Molson Brewery.
DAmT April'93
SECTOR. Transportation
INVESTOR: Canadian National Railways (Can), KLLM (US)
TYPE OF I vgsTMENr:AIiance which allows the two companies to move fresh produce from
California, the Gulf Coast and Mexico to Canada. The service will carry processed food
from Canada on the return journey.
ComMENTS: Allows CN to take advantage of opportunity to increase intermodal traffic
between US, Canada and Mexico. Positions KLLM to take advantage of return traffic.
DAm November '93
SECTOR. Steel
INVESTOR: Ipsco Steel (Can)
TYPE OF INVESTMENT. Planned construction of a steel mini-mill in the US.
ComMENTS: Location is to be in Iowa, subject to approval by Iowa government. Production




INVESTOR: Western Union (US)
TYPE OF INvEsmENl:. IV with Elektra (Mex).
CoMMENTs: Provides money transfer service from U.S. to Mexico.
DAi December '93
INVESTOR: Standard & Poor's Ratings Group (US)
TYPE OF INvEsTmENr. Acquired all outstanding shares of Calificadora de Valores (CAVAL)
(Mex), Mexico's largest rating agency. The rating agency will be called S&P-CAVAL
Commnors: Allows S&P to better meet the needs of the Medcan capital market.
DATE September '93
INVESTow Bank of Nova Scotia (Can)
TYPE OF INmSmEN. Acquired interest in Grupo Financiero Inverlat (Mex).
Com rms: 5% percent interest in Mexico's fourth largest financial group. A technical ser-
vices agreement was also reached. Will help better serve needs of customers doing business
in Mexico ($75 million investment).
DATE: 1993
IN VE TOR: Caisses Dejardins (Can)
TYPE OF INvEsrmENr Established branch operations in Allendale, Florida.
Comlmwr Enables them to better serve growing Canadian community and business
clients in Florida.
DATE: 1992
INvEsTOm Grupo Finsa (Mex), Texas Pacific Group (US), Richard Blum & Associates (US),
and Sturn & Associates (US).
TYPE OF INvEsr. All are owners of Banco Allianza (Mex). Will have operations in
Matamoros, Mexico City, Monterrey, and Victoria.




INVEsYo: Alexander & Alexander (US)
TYPE OF INvEsMENT'. Acquired stake in Asesores Kennedy Agente de Seguros (Mex).
Comm mrs 80% interest in the insurance broker, better positions A&A to take advantage of
growing Mexican insurance market.
DATE: January'94
INvsTo: Liberty Mutual (US)
TYPE OF INVESTMEr. Opened office in Mexico City, Servicios Liberty.
COMMENiS: Provide occupational health and safety services and products to companies in
Mexico.
DATE January'94
INVESTOR Johnson & Higgins (US)
TYPE OF INvEsTmENr. Acquired stake in Brockman y Schuh (Mex).
CoMmmns: 25% of the Mexican insurance firm. Expands service capabilities in Mexico.
DAm: November '93
INvEST O: New York Life (US)
TYPE OF INmESTmENr Acquired stake in Geo, Compania de Seguros (Mex).




TYPE OF INvESTMEN r Acquired interest in Seguros Equitativa, and its affiliate, Central de
Fianzas (Mex).
CoMMEms: 30% interest in both the insurance, and the surety and bonding companies.
DATE Summer '92
INVESToR: Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (US), Banco Santandar (Spain), Various
Mexican investors.
TYPE OF INvEsTmENr. JV with Banco Santandar (Spain to form Seguros Genesis.
COMMENTS: 49% of JV owned by MetLife and Banco Santandar, with rest held by other
Mexican investors. Is MetLife's first venture into Latin American, and is an opportunity to
participate in a market where there is large growth potential. Seguros Genesis will sell life
insurance and pension products.
DATE August'92
The Department of Commerce would like to thank Dr. Fernando Robles of The George Washington
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PERCENTAGE GROWTH IN U.S., CANADIAN, MEXICAN EXPORTS
TO NORTH AMERICA AND REST OF WORLD
INTRA-NORTH AMERICAN EXPORTS G-R-OWING MORE THAN








Intra-North American N.A. to Rest of World
Growth In Exports 1980-1993
FIGURE 4
INTRA-NORTH AMERICAN EXPORTS AS PERCENT OF TOTAL
NORTH AMERICAN EXPORTS: 1980, 1993
INTRA-NORTH AMERICAN EXPORTS SOON WILL ACCOUNT













Intra-N.A. Trade N.A. Home Investment N.A. GDP
Percentage Growth 1980-1993
CANADIAN AND MEXICAN DATA IS 1992, EXCEIPT MEXICAN INVESTMENT
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census
FIGURE 6
IMPORTS UNDER SECTION 9802 (CO-PRODUCTION)
AND PERCENTAGE U.S. COMPONENTS, 1992
U.S. COMPONENTS IN PRODUCTION- SHARING IMPORTS FROM
MEXICO/CANADA MUCH! HIGHER THAN TO REST OF WORLD
70%











-- Left column represents percent of Imports under Section 9802
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census

